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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
William Jack Bias timely appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction, 
challenging its order denying Mr. Bias' request for the appointment of substitute 
counsel. Mr. Bias argues that the district court erred when it failed to inquire into 
Mr. Bias' request for the appointment of new counsel. Mr. Bias also argues that the 
district court erred when it failed to appoint substitute counsel because trial counsel was 
representing Mr. Bias under an actual conflict of interest. Mr. Bias also argues that his 
sentence is excessively harsh. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Police pulled over Mr. Bias after observing his car "drifting in its lane." 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) The officer could smell 
alcohol and noticed an open container of whiskey. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Bias' seventeen 
year-old son was in the back seat of the car and admitted that he drank some of his 
father's whiskey. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Mr. Bias was eventually arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol (hereinafter, DUI). (PSI, p.4.) 
Mr. Bias was charged, by information, with a misdemeanor charge of injury to a 
child, and a DUI with a felony enhancement. (R., pp.36-37.) Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Mr. Bias pleaded guilty to a felony DUI and, in return, the State dismissed 
the remaining charge. (R., pp.45-46, 50; 02/11/13 Tr., p.1, L.20 - p.2, L.B.) Thereafter, 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed. 
(R., pp.50-51.) Mr. Bias timely appealed. (R., pp.55-57.) 
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In the meantime, trial counsel filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 
35) motion requesting leniency. (R., pp.53-53.) Mr. Bias then field a pro se motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, a pro se motion requesting appointment of counsel, and a pro 
se motion to transport in order to "be present for [h]earing.,,1 Mr. Bias supported his 
request for the appointment of new counsel with the claim that his relationship with his 
current counsel had become irreparably damaged, due to the claims raised in his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Motion for the Appointment of Counsel 
(Augmentation), pp.1-2.) 
A hearing was held on these motions. (see generally 06/24/13 Tr.) However, 
Mr. Bias was not present for the hearing despite his motion for transport. (06/24/13 
Tr., p.16, Ls.7-13; Motion for Order to Transport (Augmentation), pp.1-2.) 
At the hearing, trial counsel indicated that the pro se motions might be, in 
substance, a petition for post-conviction relief because the claims made in support of 
the motion to withdraw Mr. Bias' guilty plea appeared to be based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel. (06/24/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.22-25; Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
and Supporting Information (Augmentation), pp.1-2.) The district court then stated it 
was also unsure about the nature of the pro se motions. (06/24/13 Tr., p.18, L.15 -
p.19, L.17, p.20, L.18 - p.21, L.25.) Specifically, the district court was unsure if the 
request for the appointment of counsel was in substance either a request for substitute 
counsel in relation to the Rule 35 motion or a request for the appointment for counsel to 
represent Mr. Bias in post-conviction proceedings. (06/24/13 Tr., p.18, L.15 - p.19, 
L.17, p.20, L.18 - p.21, L.25.) Both trial counsel and the district court appeared to agree 
1 The materials related to theses motions are currently not in the record on appeal. 
Accordingly, a motion to augment the record on appeal has been filed concurrently with 
this brief. 
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that the motion for the appointment of counsel was a request for "new" counsel. 
(06/24/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.22-25, 18, L.15 - p.19, L.17.) In order to resolve this confusion, 
the district court decided to deny the Rule 35 motion without prejudice, which the district 
court thought would allow Mr. Bias to file another Rule 35 motion, in the event the 
district court determined that it would grant the motion for the appointment of counsel. 
(06/24/13 Tr., p.19, Ls.7-17, p.20, Ls.18-21.) The district court then denied all of the 
remaining motions without prejudice. (06/24/13 Tr., p.21, L.20 - p.22, L.11.) 
After the hearing, the district court entered a written order denying all of the 
pending motions with prejudice, but did not rule on the merits of any specific claims 
relating to the adequacy of trial counsel's performance.2 (Order Denying All Pending 
Motions (Augmentation), pp.1-2.) 
2 Mr. Bias is not challenging the denial of either his motion to withdraw his guilty plea or 
his Rule 35 motion on appeal. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bias' motion for the appointment of 
new counsel to represent him in regard to his Rule 35 motion and his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
ten years, with five years fixed, upon Mr. Bias following his plea of guilty to a 
felony DUI? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bias' Motion For The Appointment Of New 
Counsel To Represent Him In Regard To His Rule 35 Motion And His Motion to 
Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Bias requested the appointment of counsel because he had made claims 
against his trial counsel in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. When a 
district court becomes aware of an actual conflict of interest between trial counsel and a 
defendant, the district court must appoint substitute counsel. Moreover, when a 
defendant requests the appointment of new counsel, generally, a duty is triggered and 
the district court must afford the defendant an opportunity to explain the basis for the 
request. Mr. Bias argues, based on both his constitutional right to counsel and his 
statutory right to counsel, that both of these duties were triggered when he filed his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his motion requesting the appointment of counsel, 
and that the district court erred when it failed to appoint new counsel. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Constitutional issues and the construction and application of legislative acts are 
pure questions of law over which [Idaho appellate courts exercise] free review. State v. 
Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 136 (2001). To determine if the court conducted an adequate 
inquiry into reasons why substitute counsel should have been appointed and whether a 
person wishes to reject the court appointed counsel and self-represent, should be 
reviewed de novo. See State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711 (Ct. App. 1997). Additionally, the 
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adequacy of a district court's inquiry into a conflict of interests is a question of law over 
which Idaho appellate courts exercise free review. Statton, 136 Idaho at 136. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Appointment Substitute Counsel As 
An Actual Conflict of interest Existed 
Mr. Bias' pro se motions created an actual conflict of interest which required the 
district court to appoint conflict counsel. Every defendant has the right to be 
represented by conflict-free counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73 (1981). 
Mr. Bias has a Sixth Amendment a right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal 
process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion. Wade, 125 Idaho at 523. Additionally, 
the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a statutory right to counsel which carries with it 
the correlative right to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Hall, _ P.3d _, 2013 
WL 6225673, at *4 (2013);3 see also Hernandez, 127 Idaho at 687. A right to effective 
assistance of counsel carries with it the right to conflict free counsel. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
446 U.S. 335, 348-349 (1980). When an actual conflict exists and a district court fails to 
grant a request for the appointment of conflict counsel, reversal is mandatory. Cuyler, 
446 U.S. at 348-349. 
An actual conflict of interest existed in this matter. Mr. Bias' motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea contained allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and his motion 
for the appointment of counsel alleged that his relationship with trial counsel was 
irreparably damaged due to his claims that trial counsel was ineffective in regard to the 
entry of his plea. (Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Supporting Information 
(Augmentation), pp.1-2); (Motion for the Appointment of Counsel (Augmentation), pp.1-
3 The Hall Opinion analyzed the right to conflict free counsel during post-conviction 
proceedings after the imposition of the death penalty. 
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2.) At the hearing on Mr. Bias' pending motions, trial counsel stated that he thought that 
Mr. Bias' pro se motions were in substance as "a petition for post-conviction relief." 
(06/24/13 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.22.) The district court was also uncertain about the 
nature of Mr. Bias' pro se motion, and expressed its confusion as follows: 
As far as the pending Motions, the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty 
Plea, Rule 33 states pretty clearly that you can't bring a Motion to 
Withdraw a Guilty plea after sentencing except [when] there's a manifest 
injustice. In reviewing the Motion that was filed essentially the issues 
being raised there appear to be ineffective assistance of counsel-type 
issues and typically those type of issues are resolved via post-conviction 
relief. 
The Defendant asking for the Court to appoint new counsel for him 
while his case is under appeal, under the circumstances I don't think the 
Court should appoint new counsel at this time. In essence, he's trying to 
get new counsel to handle Rule 35 -- excuse me, post-conviction relief. 
(06/24/13 Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.21.) However, the district court also indicated that it also 
considered the request for the appointment of counsel a request for new counsel to 
represent him in regard to the Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. (06/24/13 Tr., p.19, 
Ls.7-17.) 
Based on the foregoing facts, the district court erred when it failed to grant his 
motion for the appointment of new counsel because the claims Mr. Bias made against 
trial counsel in the motion to withdraw his guilty plea created an actual conflict of 
interest as trial counsel had a personal interest in seeing those claims denied. The fact 
that the district court thought that the motion to withdraw Mr. Bias' guilty plea was 
potentially, in substance, a petition under the Uniform Post-Convict Procedures Act 
claiming that trial counsel was ineffective only exacerbates the nature of this conflict.4 
4 The district court could not treat Mr. Bais' motion to withdraw his guilty plea as a 
petition for post-conviction because it was filed in this case. See State v. Allen, 153 
Idaho 367 (Ct. App. 2012). 
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As such, trial counsel was in an adversarial relationship with Mr. Bias in regard to the 
motion to withdraw Mr. Bias' guilty plea at the June 24, 2013 hearing, and the district 
court should have granted the motion for the appointment of new counsel and continued 
the hearing. However, the district court required trial counsel to continue his 
representation of Mr. Bias in regard to both the Rule 35 motion and the motion to 
withdraw Mr. Bias' guilty plea. This is reversible error and this case should be 
remanded with instructions to allow Mr. Bias to be appointed substitute trial counsel and 
the opportunity for rehearing on the Rule 35 motion and the motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. 
In sum, the district court erred in requiring trial counsel to continue representing 
Mr. Bias while operating under an actual conflict of interest. 
D. The District Court Inadequately Inquired Into Mr. Bias' Request For Substitute 
Counsel 
"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 
of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel." State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 
586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007). "A criminal defendant has a right to counsel at all critical 
stages of the criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion." State v. Wade, 
125 Idaho 522,523 (Ct. App. 1994).5 
In addition to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, I.C. § 19-852 also provides 
criminal defendants a statutory right to counsel which extends to Rule 35 proceedings. 
5 The plain language of Wade notwithstanding, in State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454, 
458 n.2 (Ct. App. 2010), the Court of Appeals cited to Wade for the proposition that a 
criminal defendant only has a statutory right to an attorney during Rule 35 proceedings. 
Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 458 n.2. The Court of Appeals also held that "a post-judgment 
hearing upon a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a critical stage for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment." Id. at 458. 
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State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454,458 n.2 (Ct. App. 2010). A statutory right to counsel 
carries with it the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel. Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 (1995) ("We can see no legitimate 
basis for determining whether there has been a violation of the right to effective of 
counsel guaranteed by I.C. § 19-852 differently from determining whether there has 
been a violation of a similar constitutional right."). 
"It is well settled that an indigent's right to court-appointed counsel includes the 
right to effective assistance of counsel, but it does not necessarily include the right to an 
attorney of one's own choice." State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 11 (Ct. App. 1995). While a 
criminal defendant does not have the right to counsel of his/her choice, however, "for 
'good cause' a trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an 
indigent defendant." Lippert, 145 Idaho at 594. 
Good cause can be established if there is a total breakdown in attorney client 
communications. State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 285 (2013). In the event a defendant 
claims that there has been a total breakdown in attorney-client communications, a duty 
is triggered requiring the district court to inquire into the defendant's basis for that claim. 
Id. The trial court must afford the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the 
facts and reasons in support of a motion for substitution of counsel. Id. In fact, this 
must occur even if the district court has "well-founded suspicions of intentional delay 
and manipulative tactics," as there can be "no substitute for the inquires necessary to 
protect a defendant's constitutional rights." Peck, 130 Idaho at 714. 
While a district court must afford a defendant a full and fair opportunity to present 
facts to support the request for the appointment of counsel, the duty to inquire does not 
impose an onerous burden on the court. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court found 
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that this duty to inquire was satisfied when the trial court asked the defendant to make 
any statements he desired in support of his motion for substitute counsel. State v. 
Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898 (1980). Conversely, in Peck, supra, this duty to inquire 
was not satisfied when the Mr. Peck was not allowed to address the court concerning 
his desire for substitute trial counsel. Peck 130 Idaho at 713-14. In coming to that 
conclusion, the Idaho Court of Appeals reasoned as follows: 
As [Mr. Peck] points out, this Court cannot discern whether he had 
legitimate grounds for his request for new counsel, such as an actual 
conflict of interest or a deficiency in the public defenders' performance. 
Nor can we ascertain from the record whether Peck wished to represent 
himself, as was his right, in preference to continuing with representation 
by the appointed counsel. The record reveals no reason for summarily 
rejecting [Mr. Peck's] request, as the district court appears to have done. 
Id. at 714. As stated above, the duty to inquire imposes a minimal burden on a district 
court. Once a defendant has requested the appointment of substitute counsel the 
district court must provide a defendant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the 
request, even if the district court has "well founded suspicions" that the request is 
merely a means to manipulate the court. Id. 
In this case, Mr. Bias filed a motion for the appointment of counsel alleging that 
his relationship with trial counsel was irreparably damaged due to his claims that trial 
counsel was ineffective in regard to the entry of his plea. (Motion for the Appointment of 
Counsel (Augmentation), pp.1-2.) Mr. Bias argues that this request triggered the district 
court's mandatory duty to inquire into Mr. Bias' request for substitute counsel. Instead 
of asking Mr. Bias why he wanted new counsel, the district court did not even allow 
Mr. Bias to appear at the hearing on his motion (06/24/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.7-13), even 
though Mr. Bias filed a motion for transport to be present for any hearings on the 
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pending motions.6 (Motion for Order to Transport (Augmentation), pp.1-2.) All the 
district court needed to do was allow Mr. Bias to appear at that hearing telephonically 
and provide him an opportunity to explain the basis for his motion requesting substitute 
counsel. This error is amplified because the district court and trial counsel both 
recognized Mr. Bias' motion was for "new counsel," but were unsure if it was in regard 
to the remaining motions in the criminal case or if it was a request for counsel to 
represent him in proceedings under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act. 
(06/24/13 Tr .. p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.7, p.18, L.15 - p.19, L.17, p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.19.) As 
such, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Bias' motion for the appointment of new 
counsel. 
As a final note, the district court ultimately denied Mr. Bias' request for the 
appointment of counsel on the basis that it had already appointed appellate counsel. 
(Order Denying All Pending Motions (Augmentation), pp.1-2.) This rationale is flawed, 
as the State Appellate Public Defender's Office can only represent non-capital felony 
defendants for purposes of appellate proceedings. I.C. § 19-870. In fact, the district 
court's Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender states that the "State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office shall represent [Mr. Bias] for this appeal." (R., p.58.) 
As such, there is no authority which would enable his appellate counsel to appear 
before the district court and represent him as trial counselor as his conflict trial counsel. 
Therefore, the mere fact that appellate counsel had been appointed did not cure the 
district court's failure to inquire into Mr. Bias' request for the appointment of substitute 
trial counsel. 
6 At a minimum, the district court could have allowed Mr. Bias to appear at the hearing 
telephonically. 
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In sum, the district court erred when it did not afford Mr. Bias the opportunity to 
explain why he wanted the appointment of new counsel. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten 
Years, With Five Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Bias Following His Plea Of Guilty To A Felony 
DUI 
Mr. Bias asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten 
years, with five years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Bias does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Bias must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of 
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. Id. 
There are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that Mr. Bias' 
sentence is excessively harsh. Specifically, the nature of the offense is a mitigating 
factor. Mr. Bias' brother committed suicide and, a few days later, Mr. Bias decided to 
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take a nostalgic drive to Ashton, Idaho where is brother was living at the time of his 
death. (PSI, pp.4, 14.) While in Aston, Mr. Bias decided to go to bar which was owned 
by his brother's former mother-in-law. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Bias then made the poor decision 
to drive home. (PSI, p.4.) While this is no excuse for his behavior, it does put his 
decision to drink and drive into context, as Mr. Bias was not thinking clearly due to the 
obvious grief caused by his brother's death. 
Additionally, Mr. Bias' difficult childhood is a mitigating factor. Mr. Bias' parents 
had a rocky relationship and separated many times until they finally divorced when he 
was six years old. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Bias was exposed to instability, abuse, and 
alcoholism as a young child. (PSI, p.22.) When he was nineteen, Mr. Bias was drinking 
and was involved in a car accident that resulted in the death of his friend. (Idaho 
Standard Mental Health Assessment Attached to the PSI, p.?) Mr. Bias' father also 
committed suicide when Mr. Bias was only eight years old. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Bias 
grandfather also committed suicide. (PSI, p.1B.) The fact that Mr. Bias' grandfather, 
and father committed suicide must amplified the pain Mr. Bias suffered as he learned 
about his brother's suicide, opening deep psychological wounds Mr. Bias suffered as a 
young child. 
Mr. Bias is a father of four children and before he was arrested for the instant 
offense he provided financial support for three of his children, as his oldest is an adult. 
(PSI, p.16.) At the time of the presentence investigation, Mr. Bias did not owe any child 
support. (PSI, p.16.) 
Mr. Bias has a history of mental health issues. Mr. Bias has suffered from 
depression since he was a teenager. (Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment 
Attached to the PSI, p.?) Mr. Bias depression intensified after his bother committed 
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suicide and Mr. Bias has "ongoing suicidal ideations" as a result. (Idaho Standard 
Mental Health Assessment Attached to the PSI, p.7.) Mr. Bias also described 
symptoms associated with PTSD. (Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment 
Attached to the PSI, p.7.) 
Mr. Bias earned his GED and HSE. (PSI, p.17.) Mr. Bias also has a relatively 
strong employment background and was making thirty five dollars an hour at his last 
job. (PSI, pp.17-18.) Mr. Bias indicated that he had never been fired. (PSI, p.17.) 
The PSI investigator also noted that Mr. Bias "appears to be truly remorseful for 
his actions in the instant offense, and [his] prior offenses. (PSI, p.22.) Mr. Bias also 
"fully understands the impact that his actions have had, and could have, on himself and 
others." (PSI, p.22.) He also "appears to be sincere in his desire to obtain treatment for 
both his alcohol addiction .... " (PSI, p.22.) 
In sum, Mr. Bias' sentence is excessively harsh when it is viewed in light of the 
mitigating factors present in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bias respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for further 
proceedings and instructions to appoint substitute counsel. Alternatively, Mr. Bias 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for further proceedings and 
instructions to conduct the appropriate inquiries regarding Mr. Bias' request for 
substitute counsel. Alternatively, Mr. Bias respectfully requests that this Court reduce 
the fixed portion of his sentence. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2014. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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